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A World Climate Bank
John Broome and Duncan K. Foley
9.1 The Proposal
Because the emission of climate-damaging greenhouse gases (GHG), even with
current policies in place, represents an incompletely corrected externality in the
world economic system, standard economic welfare analysis implies the exist-
ence of policies to correct it that are Pareto-improving both within and across
generations. Thepolitical economicproblemof climatedamage is thedivisionof
a potential surplus, not the allocation of a cost. The risk in this situation is that,
through failing to agree on the distribution of the potential economic surplus
conferred by correcting the GHG externality, current generations may fail
to realize this large potential gain altogether. Pareto-improving policies shift
resources from conventional investments to GHGmitigation. The reduction in
climate damage compensates future generations for the reduction in conven-
tional investment. We propose the issuance of World Climate Bonds through a
WorldClimate Bank toﬁnance the shift from fossil fuel to renewable energy and
the compensation of those in the current generation who would be net losers
from such a shift. The rise in world interest rates due to the issuance of these
bonds will contribute to the reduction in conventional investment. In order to
strengthen the market for the World Climate Bonds we argue for making them
international reserve assets analogous to Special Drawing Rights at the IMF, and
for capitalizing theWorldClimateBankwith irreversible commitments of shares
of national tax revenues from carbon taxes and other sources.
9.2 Introduction
It is commonly assumed that responding to climate change requires the
current generation to make a sacriﬁce. But actually no sacriﬁce or burden is
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necessary. Climate change can be controlled without a sacriﬁce by anyone.
This means literally anyone: each person in every generation. A response
without any sacriﬁce is not ideal, as we shall explain, but we believe it is the
best that can actually be achieved. To make it possible in practice, there needs
to be a major development in the international ﬁnancial system. We need a
new ﬁnancial institution, a World Climate Bank.
9.3 Externalities and Inefﬁciency
Burning fossil fuels entails an economic externality. When people burn car-
bon, they balance the costs of doing so against the beneﬁts they derive. The
costs they take into account include the price of the fuel, but they do not
include the ’external cost’ that is caused by emitting greenhouse gas. This
external cost is the harm done to people all over the world by adding to
climate change. Emitters of greenhouse gas normally ignore this cost, with
the result that they emit more than is efﬁcient.
An externality leads to what is technically known as ’inefﬁciency’.
A situation is inefﬁcient if a Pareto improvement is possible, and a Pareto
improvement is a change that is better for some people without being worse
for anyone. We are in an inefﬁcient state as a result of greenhouse-gas emis-
sions. No trade-off is therefore necessary between the welfare of present and
future generations in controlling climate change; policies are available that
will beneﬁt both. Correcting the greenhouse-gas externality provides an eco-
nomic beneﬁt that can be distributed to people in both present and future
generations.
There are some rare exceptions to the rule that an externality leads to
inefﬁciency, and it is tempting to assume that the intergenerational aspect
of climate change is one. Here is an analogy. Suppose the wind blows
from Windward Island to Leeward Island. Industrial processes on Wind-
ward Island beneﬁt the Windward Islanders, but they harm the Leeward
Islanders by bathing them in smog. The smog is an externality, and it leads
to inefﬁciency. A Pareto improvement is possible. Since at present it
costs the Windward Islanders nothing to emit smog, they emit so much
that the marginal beneﬁt to them of emissions is zero. Consequently, even
a small fee would compensate them for reducing their emissions a little.
They could accept the fee, reduce emissions, and end up better off. The
Leeward Islanders could pay them a fee set at a level the Leeward Islanders
ﬁnd worth paying. Reducing emissions in exchange for this fee will beneﬁt
both sides.
So far all is as expected: the externality causes inefﬁciency. But now suppose
the wind blows so strongly that the Leeward Islanders can send nothing
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upwind to Windward Island. Paying a fee is impossible. Then no Pareto
improvement is possible. Reducing emissions wouldmake the Leeward Island-
ers better off, but it would make the Windward Islanders worse off, and they
cannot be compensated for their loss. In this case, even though there is an
externality, there is no inefﬁciency. This example may seem to be a metaphor
for intergenerational relations, since later generations can do nothing for
earlier ones. The current generation emits greenhouse gas, which harms future
generations, but future generations have no means of compensating the
present generation for reducing its emissions. So after all, greenhouse-gas
emissions do not cause inefﬁciency between generations. The damage they
do can be reduced only by the present generation’s making a sacriﬁce. That is
how it may seem.
But let us change the example once again. Suppose the Windward Island-
ers regularly ﬂoat nice things downwind to the Leeward Islanders as a gift.
Perhaps they do this out of pure altruism, or perhaps they think they
owe the Leeward Islanders some compensation for the harm done by their
smog. Then the situation is inefﬁcient once again; a Pareto improvement
is possible. The Windward Islanders have the option of withholding
some of the gifts they send to Leeward Island, and keeping them for their
own enjoyment. So they can choose to reduce their emissions and com-
pensate themselves for doing so by withholding gifts. Since the marginal
beneﬁt to the Windward Islanders of emissions is zero, any small quantity
of gifts withheld will be enough to compensate for a small reduction
in emissions, and make them better off on balance. The amount can be
so small that the Leeward Islanders are also better off. The change is a Pareto
improvement.
This last version of the example is a better metaphor for intergenerational
relations. The current generation leaves greenhouse gas for future gener-
ations, but it also leaves them nice things. It leaves conventional capital
such as roads and cities, and it leaves natural resources, because it does not
use up all the natural resources it could. It can therefore compensate itself
for reducing its emissions of greenhouse gas. By reducing its transfer of
resources forward in time, it can in effect transfer resources backwards from
future generations to itself. This transfer can serve as compensation from
future generations to the present. In effect, the current generation has
only to switch some of its investment from building conventional capital
to reducing greenhouse-gas emissions. By this means, a Pareto improvement
is possible.
What if the current generation leaves goods for future generations only
as a by-product of doing the best it can for itself? For example, it develops
technological knowledge for its own advantage, and future generations
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automatically beneﬁt from this knowledge. If the current generation acts out
of pure self-interest in this way, no reduction in investment can beneﬁt it. But
it is implausible that members of a generation act only for themselves. Most
people who possess wealth leave some of it to posterity, whereas they could
keep it all for themselves by converting it to an annuity before they die. There
is evidence that people they have a ‘bequest motive’, which means they value
leaving money to their heirs (Lockwood 2012). But even if, implausibly, the
present generation is purely self-interested, it has another means of compen-
sating itself for reducing emissions. It can exploit the fact that generations
overlap.
Suppose generation A and generation C do not overlap each other, but
generation B overlaps both. Suppose A harms C by its emissions of greenhouse
gas but (suppose for simplicity) it does not harm B. B can serve as a conduit for
transferring resources from C to A. B can hand over resources to A at the
beginning of B’s life when it overlaps with A, and collect resources from C at
the end of B’s life when it overlaps with C. This would make B worse off
when young but better off when old, and the quantities may be adjusted
to make B equally well off overall. Then the net result of this transaction is
to beneﬁt A at a cost to C; it is a transfer from C to A. It can be used to
compensate A for reducing the harm it does to C by cutting its emissions.
Both A and C can be made better off this way, so once again the externality
creates inefﬁciency.
One way of implementing this sort of transfer is through old-age pensions.
Pensioners consume goods at a time when they do not produce them; pen-
sioners’ goods are produced for themby the young. If there is a pension scheme
in our example, B hands over goods to Awhen A is old, and C hands over goods
to B when B is old. To compensate A for reducing its emissions, pensions can
simply be increased.
In sum, there are no good grounds for doubting that the greenhouse-gas
externality causes inefﬁciency between generations. It clearly causes inefﬁ-
ciency within a generation. These inefﬁciencies can be corrected in a way that
requires a sacriﬁce from no one. However, it is true that the degree of inter-
generational inefﬁciency, and so the potential for Pareto improvement, is
constrained by the opportunities there are for backwards intergenerational
transfers.
9.4 Injustice and Maldistribution
Inefﬁciency is not the only bad consequence of greenhouse-gas emissions.
Two others are injustice and maldistribution.
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Doing harm to another person is generally an injustice done her. This is not
an invariable rule; there are some exceptional cases. For example, harm done
in self-defence is often permissible. When a person emits greenhouse gas she
harms others. This is an injustice done them; it is not one of the exceptional
cases where harm is permissible. Suppose this person reduces her emissions in
a way that leads to a Pareto improvement; this could be achieved by her
victims paying her a fee to do so. Although there is a Pareto improvement,
the injustice remains. Suppose you unjustly harm someone every day, but
then your victim pays you a fee to stop harming her. Then the transaction is a
Pareto improvement—it is better for both you and her—but the injustice
remains. Removing inefﬁciency by compensating emitters does not remove
injustice.
There is maldistribution of wealth both between generations and within the
current generation. That is to say, the world would be a better place if its
wealth was distributed differently. Maldistribution is sometimes called ’dis-
tributive injustice’, but it is not the same as the injustice of harming another
person that is described in the previous paragraphs. Indeed, it may pull in the
opposite direction. In the island example, the Windward Islanders do an
injustice to the Leeward Islanders by their emissions of smog. However, their
emissions may not cause maldistribution. If the Windward Islanders are less
prosperous than the Leeward Islanders, their emissions may actually improve
the distribution of wealth by decreasing inequality.
Some of the world’s maldistribution is caused by greenhouse gas. By and
large, those in the present generation who beneﬁt from emitting greenhouse
gas are better off than those of the present generation who are harmed by their
emissions. In this respect, climate change exacerbates the intragenerational
maldistribution that results from other causes. Other causes include colonial
exploitation over centuries, and more than 200 years of very unequal eco-
nomic development. By contrast, the economic effects of climate change have
become signiﬁcant only in the last few decades. Climate change is too recent
to be a major contributor to the maldistribution that exists within the current
generation.
Between generations things are different. Unless climate change becomes
extreme, future generations will on average be better off than us. Our present
emissions will diminish the quality of life of those better-off generations. So
they actually increase equality between generations. However, if we give value
to aggregate well-being as well as to equality in well-being, the best distribu-
tion is unequal rather than equal. This is because we possess a productive
technology that can, in effect, convert a quantity of goods at one time into a
greater quantity of goods at a later time. Delaying consumption of goods
consequently adds to the total of goods that are eventually consumed. It is
therefore better to allow future generations to consume more than earlier
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ones. Given that, climate change may add to maldistribution even as it makes
the distribution between generations more equal.
Figure 9.1 shows a ‘production possibility frontier’ in which future gener-
ations have the possibility of greater consumption than the present one. It
also shows contours of value that illustrate—in a very schematic way—the
value theories of two different economists. The best situation according to
both theories gives more consumption to future generations than to the
present generation. The Stern Review (Stern et al. 2007) recommends us to
accept a small reduction in our income (perhaps 2 per cent) in order to bring
about a much larger increase in world income in 150 years’ time. William
Nordhaus (2008) also suggests that an optimal response to climate change
involves a reduction in present consumption. Both theories imply that achiev-
ing the best possible outcome, starting from business as usual, requires the
current generation to reduce its consumption. It follows that removing the
inefﬁciency caused by greenhouse gas through a Pareto improvement does
not achieve the best possible outcome. It results in maldistribution.
Future
generation’s
consumption
Nordhaus’s
value
contour
Stern’s
value
contour
Nordhaus’s
optimum
Stern’s
optimum
Possibility
frontier
Business
as
usual
Present
generation’s
consumption
Pareto
improvement
Figure 9.1. Future and Present Generations’ Consumption
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How much of this maldistribution between generations should be attrib-
uted to climate change? This is hard to judge. A potentially large source of
intergenerational maldistribution is that people may persistently save less for
the future than they should save if they are to achieve the best result. Perhaps
their bequest motive is less strong than it should be. In principle there is a way
of testing whether this so. The correct social discount ratemeasures howmuch
value should be given to the future compared with the present. The market
rate of interest on risk-free assets reveals how much value people actually give
to the future compared with the present in their savings behaviour. If the two
rates are about equal, inadequate saving is not a big source of maldistribution.
However, there is not even good agreement among economists about what
the market risk-free rate of interest is, let alone about what the correct social
discount rate is. So this test is hard to apply. Still, Nordhaus (2008) takes the
risk-free interest rate to be about 6 per cent, and Stern et al. (2007) take the
social discount rate to be 1.25 per cent. Given this very big difference, there is
no good reason to think that a large proportion of maldistribution between
generations is caused by climate change.
We accept the conclusion of Stern and Nordhaus that achieving the best
outcome would require a sacriﬁce by the present generation. However, the
long record of unsuccessful negotiations under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change lead us to believe this ideal outcome is
unattainable. It demands a sacriﬁce from the present generation, which
national negotiators have shown they will not accept. For reasons of practical
politics, we think that negotiations should aim instead to achieve efﬁciency
through a Pareto improvement that beneﬁts everyone. In effect, it buys off
any opposition there might be. It should therefore be attainable. To continue
to aim for the best outcome is to make the best the enemy of the good.
We do not mean to suggest that members of the current generation have a
right to be compensated for reducing their emissions of greenhouse gas. They
do not. We are simply accepting the disappointing fact that the representa-
tives of the current generations who have power in the negotiations will not
accept a sacriﬁce.
Eliminating the externality of climate change can bring a huge beneﬁt to
the current generation. The lion’s share of it should go to the poor and to
those who have emitted little; the rich and the big emitters should receive
only a small share. If the gains are appropriately distributed, a Pareto improve-
ment can mitigate injustice and maldistribution.
Nevertheless, if efﬁciency is achieved through Pareto improvement, mal-
distribution will remain. Maldistribution is always with us. It should be
reduced, but it is politically extremely difﬁcult to reduce it. If maldistribution
were particularly the effect of climate change, there might be a case for
coupling the effort to control climate change with the aim of reducing
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maldistribution. This is what we do if we continue to aim for the best
outcome in climate change negotiations. But we have seen that intragenera-
tional maldistribution is not much caused by climate change, and there is no
good reason to think that intergenerational maldistribution is. Coupling the
two projects is therefore saddling the effort to control climate change with a
different, very intractable problem that climate change is not much respon-
sible for. Dealing with climate change is very urgent. Maldistribution should
be tackled separately.
9.5 Transforming Investment
The theory tells us that a Pareto improvement is possible. How, in more detail,
can it be achieved? This question can be answered on several different levels.
There is ﬁrst of all a real macroeconomic answer—real in the sense that it
mentions concrete goods and services rather than money. Then there is a
microeconomic answer. Finally there is a ﬁnancial answer.
The real macroeconomic answer is that there must be a transformation of
investment from conventional investment such as roadbuilding and ship-
building to what we shall call ‘green investment’, which is investment
aimed at reducing greenhouse-gas emissions. Examples of green investment
are insulating houses and building wind farms. Investment can be shifted in
this direction while leaving constant the aggregate consumption of the cur-
rent generation. The current generation will therefore suffer no loss. To be
sure, it will have to consume a new range of goods that are less carbon-
intensive, but its overall standard of living need not deteriorate.
Leaving consumption constant ensures the present generation makes no
sacriﬁce. Future generations beneﬁt from the current generation’s conven-
tional investment, and there will be less of that, but they will gain a cleaner
atmosphere instead. Provided the quantities are properly balanced, future
generations will end up better off: the cleaner atmosphere will more than
compensate for the smaller quantity of conventional capital they receive. We
know that a proper balance can be found, because the theory tells us that a
Pareto improvement is possible.
How could the needed transformation of investment be put into practice? If
there was a world government that controlled investment, it could simply do
it. It could switch some of its conventional investment towards reducing
emissions. In a capitalist economy where investment decisions are made by
private investors for the sake of proﬁts, things have to be done differently,
through the ﬁnancial system. We shall come to switching investment under
capitalism later.
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9.6 Individual Compensation
Before that, we need to examine the transformation at the microeconomic
level. Switching investment towards reducing carbon emissions is not only a
matter of building less carbon-intensive power stations. Consumer behaviour
also needs to be transformed. People need to switch their consumption
towards less carbon-intensive goods.
They can be induced to do this bymeans of a rise in the price of these goods.
To achieve efﬁciency, a price has to be set on carbon equal to the external cost
of emissions. In practice this can be done through a carbon tax or by capping
emissions, with or without the option of emissions trading. A carbon tax
transparently raises the price of carbon. Cap-and-trade schemes raise the
price by requiring the user of fossil fuels to buy a permit in addition to the
fuel. An untraded cap has the same economic effect because users who are
capped experience higher marginal costs of production due to the restriction
on their use of fossil fuels.
Consumers and producers will spontaneously defend themselves from the
effects of the carbon price by moving their consumption towards goods that
are produced with less fossil fuel energy. Suburban sprawl will give way to
more compact urban development; square feet of living space to better views
through higher buildings; aluminium containers to cardboard; commuting
automobiles to bicycles, and so forth. These defensive adjustments (economic
’substitution’) are the point of the policy: they induce people to adopt a less
carbon-intensive way of life.
To some extent substitutionmitigates the harm individuals suffer as a result
of higher energy prices. But it cannot entirely remove this harm. Consumers
will inevitably be made worse off in material terms by a rise in energy prices. If
there is to be a Pareto improvement, these losses have to be compensated for.
If there is to be a Pareto improvement, owners of fossil fuel reserves will also
have to be compensated for their losses. Current owners of fossil fuel reserves
will be losers if climate change policy succeeds in limiting the burning of
carbon-based fossil fuels. From a political point of view buying off the oppos-
ition of this wealthy and powerful group with appropriate compensation is a
critical aspect of a compensation-based policy aimed at a Pareto improvement.
Owners of fossil fuel reserves must be paid to keep carbon in the ground.
The theory of efﬁciency tells us that they can be compensated, but only for the
true value of their reserves. This is the value of the prospective revenue stream
that would ﬂow from exploiting the reserves. The market value of fossil fuel
assets may be very different from this true value (Carbon Tracker 2013). Only a
fraction of existing known reserves of fossil fuel can be used without causing
extreme climate change. No more than this fraction can generate a revenue
stream, since extreme climate change will destroy the economy that revenue
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arises from. However, the present market value of fossil fuel stocks takes
account of all known reserves. These stocks are therefore overvalued. Owners
of stocks cannot be compensated for an exaggerated value, but only for what
the stocks are really worth. They cannot be compensated for making a bad
investment.
9.7 Paying Compensation
If there is to be a Pareto improvement, the compensation described in the
previous section must be paid. Paying compensation may be thought of as a
part of green investment. In real terms, compensation must be paid out of
conventional investment. But it actually has to be paid in ﬁnancial terms, as
money. Where will the money come from? One source of revenue is from the
carbon price itself. The carbon price can provide revenue to the government. If
it is a carbon tax, the revenue goes to the government directly. If it is created
by a cap on emissions, the government can raise revenue by selling emission
permits. All this revenue can be returned to consumers and producers as part
of their compensation, by reducing their other taxes.
It will not be enough to compensate them fully for paying the higher price
of energy. A well-known theorem of welfare economics shows that consumers
cannot be made better off by imposing a tax on a good and rebating the tax as
a lump sum. But we are proposing a reduction in other taxes rather than a
lump-sum rebate. Nearly all taxes, including income taxes, themselves create
inefﬁciency. The proposal is to replace themwith an efﬁcient means of raising
revenue, namely a carbon price. So taxation as a whole will become more
efﬁcient. This improvement makes it theoretically possible that everymember
of the current generation could be fully compensated for paying the carbon
price out of the revenue that the carbon price itself raises. But this happy
outcome can be realized in practice only if the present tax system is very
inefﬁcient. It cannot be expected.
So we must assume that not all the compensation required by the current
generation can be paid from revenue raised from the current generation itself.
Some compensation will have to be ﬁnanced by borrowing. Governments or
international organizations will have to borrow on a large scale.
9.8 The Need for Social Debt
We have arrived at the need for social borrowing from the direction
of microeconomics. We can arrive at the same point from the direction of
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macroeconomics by considering how a capitalist economy can manage the
needed switch in investment from conventional to green investment.
If the allocation of resources were under direct central control, the switch
could be achieved directly by administrative decisions. In a capitalist society
where the allocation of resources is primarily determined by private invest-
ment and production decisions, government policy has to employ indirect
means to inﬂuence the composition of investment.
One available means is to issue government or international bonds. The
effect will be to push up interest rates, which in turn will crowd out some
conventional investment. The bonds constitute an alternative asset that
investors can choose to invest in, as an alternative to building conventional
capital. In order to buy bonds, they will withdraw funds from conventional
investment. These funds will come into the hands of the issuers of the bonds,
who can use them to pay for reducing emissions of greenhouse gas through
green investment. This includes compensating current consumers and produ-
cers for the increased cost of energy.
This transaction is sometimes seen as ’borrowing from the future’. This may
be a politically attractive way to think of it: the present generation borrows
from future generations to pay for improvements it makes for the sake of
future generations. And it does have the effect of moving real resources from
the future generations back to the present. It is in effect a real payment from
future generations to the present generation, to compensate the present gen-
eration for its green investment.
However, it is not literally borrowing from the future. Borrowing and repay-
ing debt are always transactions between contemporaneous agents. Present
governments borrow money from present people. When the debt is repaid,
the inheritors of the debt will repay the inheritors of the credit. That is to say,
future governments will repay future people. It is not correct to say the the
debt imposes a burden on future generations as a whole.
The purpose of the borrowing is to make it possible for the present gener-
ation to convert its investment policy from conventional investment towards
green investment. Crowding out conventional investment by raising the
interest rate is an economically efﬁcient way to do this. It eliminates whatever
private investment projects have the lowest rate of return, as efﬁciency
requires.
9.9 Institutions to Support Climate Control Bonds
Is it institutionally feasible to issue all this debt? It certainly should be. We
have shown how a Pareto improvement can be achieved in the real economy.
Conventional investment needs to be shifted into reducing greenhouse-gas
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emissions. The only remaining question is whether the world’s ﬁnancial
system can make it happen. It would be a terrible indictment of the world
order if the great gains that could be achieved by controlling climate change
were prevented by the weakness of the ﬁnancial system.
Bonds are far from the model of complete contracts on which much
economic analysis depends, and bond markets as a result operate in rather
different ways from markets in standardized commodities such as oil or
winter wheat. Long-maturity bonds can be sold only by entities that bond
purchasers regard as likely to persist and remain solvent for the maturity of
the bond. For very long maturity bonds this implies that borrowers have to
be governments, quasi-governmental organizations that share the credit
of governments, or capitalist ﬁrms with very credible long-term prospects of
survival and proﬁtability.
Inﬁnite maturity instruments have been issued by a few governments;
British consols are an example. But what is called a ‘long-term’ horizon in
existing bond markets is on the order of ﬁfty years. Climate change unfolds
over 200–400 years because carbon dioxide is removed from the atmosphere at
an extremely low rate. What are the prospects for issuing bonds with a
maturity of, say, 300 years on a large scale, to ﬁnance green investment?
Only a few national governments could borrow on reasonable terms at this
very long maturity. This observation argues for the creation of credible inter-
national institutions to underwrite the issuance of this type of debt. Let us call
the prospective institutions the ‘World Climate Bank’ orWCB. How could this
bank be governed, and how could it maintain its solvency, solidity, and
credibility for the required period?
In order to pay the interest on the bonds, theWCBwould have to command
regular revenues. Two possibilities come to mind. The ﬁrst is that the WCB
would receive the proceeds of a global carbon tax directly, or have a ﬁrst claim
on them. In the case of a system of cap-and-trade permits, the WCB could be
allocated a sufﬁcient share of the permits so that the royalty revenue would
cover the interest on its bond issuance. One advantage of carbon tax and
cap-and-trade methods of controlling emissions is that they generate an
immediate counterpart ﬂow of revenue that would be available as direct or
indirect ﬁnancing for compensation.
The second is that the WCB could claim a share of national government
revenues up to some limit that would allow it to pay interest on the appropri-
ate quantity of debt, even as the revenues from the carbon tax or royalties
decline with the declining use of fossil fuel. By this means, the WCB’s source
of revenue would be spread across many national governments, thereby
increasing the credibility of the interest guarantees in the bonds.
One of the oldest forms of organization of banks is themutual savings bank,
in which the bank is owned by its depositors, rather than by some third party.
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Supranational ﬁnancial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank are organized legally as mutual banks, in which national
governments contribute capital funds fromwhich they can draw as borrowers.
A mutual World Climate Bank could operate on the same principles. The
capital of such a bank would consist of claims on national or regional carbon
taxes or a share of emissions permits generating royalties. The WCB would
then issue long-term bonds to ﬁnance investments for climate change miti-
gation, including compensation to consumers for the carbon price. The gov-
ernance of the WCB could weight both the capital contributions of national
governments and other relevant factors, such as the exposure of nations and
regions to climate damage.
One risk the holders of WCB bonds would take is that individual nations
might withdraw from the bank for some reason, leaving it insufﬁciently
funded to meet its commitments. This consideration suggests that member-
ship in the WCB should be a precondition for membership in other inter-
national organizations such as the World Trade Organization, the IMF, and
theWorld Bank. There would then be strong incentives for individual nations
not to withdraw from the WCB.
The ability of theWCB to borrow at longmaturities and low rates of interest
would depend both on the credibility of its promises to pay and on the
creation of a market for its liabilities. One measure to support the market for
WCB bonds would be to make them eligible to serve as international reserve
assets, as are the Special Drawing Rights issued by the IMF. The goal is to
situate WCB bonds at the very highest level of world debt obligations, as close
as possible to the position now occupied by US Treasury bills, which are
regarded as almost risk-free by international ﬁnancial markets.
The low risk attributed to US Treasury bills by markets rests on the conﬁ-
dence markets place in the continued existence of the United States and in its
commitment and ability to pay interest and principal on its obligations. It is
also supported by the short maturities of Treasury bills, which renders them
relatively free of inﬂation risk. WCB bonds, on the other hand, are inherently
of long maturity. (If the WCB borrowed on shorter maturities, such as ﬁfty
years, then in order to extend the ultimate payment obligations to the more
distant future it would have to plan to reﬁnance its liabilities regularly. The
credibility of such a sequence of shorter-term ﬁnancing is effectively the same
as the credibility of regular payment of interest over a long maturity of 250
years or more.) In order to avoid inﬂation risk, the WCB could index interest
payments to the purchasing power of a broad basket of widely held world
currencies.
If the WCB indexed long maturity bonds were widely held as international
reserves, they would likely become a vehicle for private reserves seeking very
low-risk havens, which would contribute to their marketability.
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9.10 Conclusion
Greenhouse-gas emissions cause external costs. They create inefﬁciency on a
huge scale. Eliminating the inefﬁciency would lead to very great beneﬁts,
which could be distributed to the people of the world in a way that improves
the life of each of them. No one need make a sacriﬁce.
To achieve this result in real terms requires a transformation of the world’s
economy. Resources must be shifted out of conventional investment and into
reducing greenhouse-gas emissions. To make this possible in practice puts a
responsibility on the world’s ﬁnancial system. The transformation will have to
be partly ﬁnanced by very long-term loans.We need an international ﬁnancial
institution—a World Climate Bank—with enough stability and credibility to
ﬁnance these large-scale changes.1
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